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6 NOV 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Comments on DDI Reply to the IG Survey of the  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

1. The DDI reply to the IG Survey of the National Photographic Interpretation Center is both positive and pragmatic, and I am of course pleased that he found almost all of our recommendations acceptable. In those few cases where the DDI dissents from our recommendations, especially where the Survey threatens to open avenues that he feels would lead to other problems, I fully appreciate his reasoning and argumentation. Before responding to each specific dissent, I would like to offer a few general comments.

2. I am struck by the DDI's argument against a USIB-level look at the National Tasking Plan (NTP), an argument that says in effect, "let sleeping dogs lie." Certainly I can understand his reluctance to take an "irreversible step," which could be politically inexpedient and would indeed be time-consuming, before attempting his own remedies. A USIB-level review, however, cannot be postponed indefinitely. The NTP is essentially the same plan, except for minor changes, that was approved in 1967. The plan itself stipulated that it was to be reviewed and updated annually.

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which he proposes to attack the problems. We noted in the survey report that, in our opinion, an important factor for EXSUBCOM's success in achieving dominance over NPIC was the failure of the Agency to assert its management responsibilities for NPIC. Since the DDI believes that these responsibilities will be discharged, we cannot insist that the administrative approach he favors should not be given a trial. If the military agencies accede to a lesser role for EXSUBCOM, the situation will undoubtedly improve. We should be aware, however, that there are definite limits to what can be achieved by having NPIC play a more aggressive role in the decision-making concerning targets or even from a more active Agency participation in COMIREX. It is a fact that the present NTP does not give CIA or NPIC the authority to define a target of national interest. Nevertheless, if CIA stands its ground on a more vigorous test for selecting such targets, many of those now in the target deck should soon disappear.

We would suggest two additional steps to the list of measures that the DDI proposes to take to improve the NPIC/EXSUBCOM relationship. If NPIC is going to be more selective in accepting targets, it seems reasonable to expect the military agencies to demand a greater departmental role in first- and second-phase readout of targets. We believe NPIC and CIA should accept this position, and that arrangements should be worked out with the military departmental units so that NPIC can be sure of early access to any significant finds that may occur as a consequence of expanded departmental activity. If this problem is not handled carefully, the community may find itself again with uncoordinated photographic interpretation intelligence on the national scene emanating from departmental sources.

It was apparent to us that one EXSUBCOM practice that facilitated its dominant influence on NPIC was its informal way of transmitting its decisions to NPIC. Customarily, the NPIC representative to EXSUBCOM, a senior officer of the Imagery Evaluation Group (IEG), carried EXSUBCOM decisions back to IEG orally, and NPIC subsequently received a copy of the EXSUBCOM minutes. We suggest that the Director, NPIC inform the Chairman, EXSUBCOM that the NPIC member of EXSUBCOM has no authority to commit NPIC to an EXSUBCOM decision, and ask EXSUBCOM to submit its decisions formally to NPIC for concurrence. If this is done, senior NPIC management scrutiny of EXSUBCOM actions will be ensured and any disagreements that may arise can be referred to higher authority, including the USIB if necessary, for resolution.

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<b>Remarks:</b>  <p>I may have missed something here, but it appears that neither the IG nor the DDI has commented on ExDir's 18 August memorandum to the DDI on your survey of NPIC. Believe it would be helpful to Mr. Colby to have some separate comment with respect to this matter.</p>				
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